Man`s position33. The husband`s position is that he does not make available the funds necessary to conclude the purchase of the property until the terms of the financial remediation order have been agreed upon. This appears to be based on the woman`s fear that she might try to deviate from the agreement. 39. In the defence brief, it is merely argued that the husband does not accept that the February agreement was declared to each other for the overall settlement of the financial aid procedure and that the conclusion should not be made without concluding the overall transaction. Nor is it recognized that there is an offence. 58. In the February Agreement, the parties reached different terms in which it was agreed that the husband would provide the necessary funds to allow the wife to exchange contracts first and then to conclude the acquisition of the property. I am convinced with great certainty that the woman would assert her right to enforce the agreement in court.

29. These are strong and, in my view, inappropriate words, because, as the projects I mentioned show, the parties agreed that the form of security could be defined by the court without agreement between them. The lack of agreement on the form of security did not allow any of the parties to withdraw from the agreement which, in accordance with paragraph 16 of the draft decision, remained binding. This is also apparent from the letter from the woman`s lawyers of August 1: “My cardinal estate is that the ordinary principles of the treaty do not determine the questions posed in this appeal. This is due to the distinction in principle that an agreement on the compromise of a subsidiary application does not result in a legally enforceable contract. Parties wishing to maintain an agreement on the compromise of such an application cannot complain about a defined benefit. The only way to make the right deal applicable, whether it is to ensure that the plaintiff receives the agreed transfers and payments or that the respondent is protected from future claims, is to turn the contract into a court order. 49. In response to Mr. Carden`s call to the principle set out in the Xydhias Treaty and to the assertion that the February agreement and the Xydhias agreement are inseparable, so that one is not possible without the other, Mr. Hornett argues that they are different. The existence of the Xydhias agreement cannot be relied upon as a defence of the woman`s claim. The February agreement was concluded long before the Xydhias agreement and is an autonomous agreement that is not affected by the subsequent agreement.

56. I think it seems to me that the question of whether a separate agreement has been reached, separate from the agreement on the endangerment of women`s rights to financial reparation, should be addressed. Although Mr. Carden raised the locks argument during his argument, I find that the substance of the dispute between the parties lies in the question of whether, as the February agreement purports, it is a separate agreement between the parties or whether it is an agreement that is part of the procedure that leads to the compromise of the rights to financial redress.